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CAN THEISTS AVOID  
EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO MORAL  
(AND NORMATIVE) REALISM?
Justin Morton
Epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism entails mor-
al skepticism. Many philosophers have assumed that theistic moral realists 
can easily avoid such objections. In this article, I argue that things are not so 
easy: theists run the risk of violating an important constraint on replies to 
epistemological objections, according to which replies to such objections may 
not rely on substantive moral claims of a certain kind. Yet after presenting 
this challenge, I then argue that theists can meet it, successfully replying to 
the objections without relying on the problematic kinds of substantive moral 
claims. Theists have a distinctive and plausible reply to epistemological ob-
jections to moral (and, in fact, normative) realism.
Introduction
Many epistemological objections to moral realism allege that realism en-
tails moral skepticism. While it’s unclear whether such objections work 
against non-theistic moral realists, many philosophers seem to think that 
theistic realists have an obvious escape route: if God exists, there is clearly 
no epistemological obstacle to moral realism. Yet because this is taken as 
so obvious, such suggestions are crucially underdeveloped. In this paper, I 
have two main purposes. First, I want to show that things are not so simple. 
There is a good case to be made that any plausible theistic reply to these 
objections begs the question by relying on a substantive moral claim when 
our knowledge of such is precisely what is in question. My second pur-
pose is to show how the theist can plausibly answer this challenge: she can 
argue, without relying on any substantive moral claims of the kind targeted 
by such objections, that God brought about our moral knowledge. And, 
what’s more, this answer also works in reply to epistemological objections 
to normative realism more broadly: it doesn’t rely on the kind of normative 
belief targeted by such objections. I conclude that, while the theist does 
have a distinctive reply to epistemological objections, it is both far from 
obvious and very different from what many assume it would look like.
In § 1, I lay out several different epistemological objections to moral 
realism before outlining one in more detail—an evolutionary debunking 
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argument—so that I might rely on it as a test case. In § 2, I review several 
philosophers’ claims that theistic moral realism enjoys immunity from 
such epistemological objections. I then outline what I think is a natural 
case to be made for these claims. Then, in § 3, I issue a challenge for this 
“natural reply”: it seems to violate the requirement (which I defend) that 
replies to the evolutionary debunking argument not rely on a substantive 
moral claim. In § 4, I issue a challenge for the theistic moral realist: she 
must argue that God has most normative reason to bring about our moral 
knowledge. In § 5, I show two ways in which the theist might meet this 
challenge. Finally, in § 6, I argue that both responses also work in reply to 
epistemological objections to normative realism more broadly.
1. Epistemological Objections to Moral Realism
Moral realism is the thesis that (i) sincere moral judgments express beliefs, 
(ii) some of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of some moral beliefs 
does not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypo­
thetical agent.1 Many epistemological objections to moral realism have it 
that realism entails moral skepticism. Yet different objections have it that 
this entailment holds because of different constraints on knowledge—con-
straints that, if realism were true, we purportedly could not meet. In this 
section, I’ll briefly summarize a number of these general epistemological 
objections to moral realism, before going on to develop one at greater 
length. This last argument will be a test case for many of the claims I make 
about theistic moral realism in this paper.
Some think that to know something we must believe it by means of a 
non-accidentally reliable method and that moral realism fails this constraint:2
No Accident
1. To know that P, S must believe that P by means of a non­accidental-
ly reliable method.
2. If moral realism is true, then no agent believes any substantive 
moral claim by means of a non-accidentally reliable method.
3. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substan-
tive moral knowledge.
By “substantive moral knowledge,” I mean knowledge of a substan-
tive moral claim.3 What makes a moral claim substantive is hard to say: 
“Discrimination on the basis of race is bad” is substantive; “Either Bob’s 
discrimination was bad or it’s not the case that it was bad” is not. We don’t 
1See, e.g., Shafer­Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 1; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 
3–4.
2See Setiya, Knowing Right From Wrong, ch 3. For non­accidentality as a general constraint 
on knowledge, see Unger, “An Analysis of Factual Knowledge.” 
3The “substantive” qualifier isn’t always included, but it should be. No matter the nature 
of moral facts, we could have knowledge of analytic moral claims.
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need a precise definition: debunkers are targeting knowledge of claims 
like the first example, but not the second.
Many others worry that if realism is true, it would be an unexplained 
coincidence if our moral faculties were reliable:4
No Coincidence
4. To know that P, it must not be an unexplained coincidence that the 
faculties that produce S’s belief that P are reliable.
5. If moral realism is true, then it would be an unexplained coincidence 
if any agent’s moral faculties (at least those that produce substantive 
moral beliefs) were reliable.
6. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substan-
tive moral knowledge.
Two other objections to moral realism can be grouped together. Ac-
cording to the first, if realism is true, then in the nearest possible worlds 
in which our moral beliefs are false, we still have those beliefs—i.e., they 
are insensitive:5
Sensitivity
7. If for some belief that P, S believes that P in the nearest possible 
worlds in which not-P, then S does not know that P.
8. If moral realism is true, then all agents would have the substan-
tive moral beliefs they actually do in the nearest possible worlds in 
which those beliefs are false.
9. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substan-
tive moral knowledge.
According to another objection, moral realism entails that in most of the 
near-by possible worlds in which we have the moral beliefs we do, our 
moral beliefs are false—i.e., they are unsafe:6
Safety
10. If for some belief that P, P is false in most of the near­by possible 
worlds in which S believes that P, then S does not know that P.
4Street, “Darwinian Dilemma” and Street, “Reply to Copp.” See also Bedke, “Intuitive 
Non­Naturalism”; Shafer­Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking”; and Parfit, On What Matters, 
492–497. Finally, for presentation of a similar argument, see Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 
ch. 7 (esp. 7.2). 
5Bedke, “Intuitive Non-Naturalism”; Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Mathematics”; and Ka-
hane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments.” See also Joyce, The Myth of Morality, 163–165 and 
Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 125–126, especially n26. For a very similar way of formulating 
sensitivity (and safety), see, e.g., Pritchard, “Sensitivity, Safety, and Anti-Luck Epistemology.” 
6See Ruse and Wilson, “The Evolution of Ethics”; Joyce, The Evolution of Morality, 181; 
Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 120–121; and even Darwin, The Descent of Man, 102. See also 
Bogardus, “Only All Naturalists.” 
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11. If moral realism is true, then all agents’ substantive moral beliefs 
are false in most of the near-by possible worlds in which they have 
those beliefs.
12. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then no agent has any substan-
tive moral knowledge.
There will be further details and problems for each of these four argu-
ments, but such will be irrelevant here.
One might wonder what it is particularly about realism that generates 
these worries. That is, why does realism make it the case that (for example) 
no agent believes any substantive moral claim by means of a non-acciden-
tally reliable method, and so on for the other constraints on knowledge? 
There is no helpful answer available at this point in the dialectic since 
the second premise of each argument could be supported in a number of 
different ways. However, it will be helpful to see one important way these 
premises have recently been supported. To this I now turn.
Though they are inherently more general in scope, most of these ob-
jections have recently been made in a very particular form. That is, each 
has it that if realism is true, then our moral beliefs fail some particular 
necessary condition on knowledge. But many philosophers have argued 
that it is the influence of evolution on our moral beliefs that results in the 
failure of that necessary condition.7 For most of the rest of my paper, I deal 
exclusively with such evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). I do 
this primarily just in order to have a single test case. But EDAs are an espe-
cially good test case for claims about the more general objections since for 
any of those objections there is an EDA that is a particular version of it. For 
these reasons, let us turn now to consider what I call the Standard EDA:
The Standard EDA
13. (Epistemological Premise) If (a) moral realism is true, (b) evolution 
has strongly influenced our moral faculties in such a way that those 
faculties are disposed to produce beliefs with certain propositional 
contents over others, and (c) there is no independent confirmation 
of the reliability of those faculties, then we have no substantive 
moral knowledge.
14. (Empirical Premise) Evolution has strongly influenced our moral 
faculties in such a way that those faculties are disposed to produce 
beliefs with certain propositional contents over others.
15. (Autonomy) There is no independent confirmation of the reliability 
of our moral faculties.
7See Street, “Darwinian Dilemma”; Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, ch. 13; and Joyce, The 
Evolution of Morality. See also Horn, “Evolution and the Epistemological Challenge”; Greene, 
“Secret Joke”; Kitcher, “Biology and Ethics”; and Ruse and Wilson, “Moral Philosophy as 
Applied Science.”
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16. Therefore, if moral realism is true, then we have no substantive 
moral knowledge.8
Let’s briefly look at the premises in more detail.
Premise (14) is not my concern here, since theism generally does nothing 
to aid a denial of evolutionary influence on our moral faculties.9 Perhaps 
theists have a special purchase on denials of evolution altogether—but I 
will make my task easier by only considering types of theism which are 
compatible with evolutionary biology. Premise (15) will end up being the 
theist’s target. But before moving on to see whether she can hit that target, 
let’s get a quick look at how the standard debunker could support (13).
It is (13) where the four general epistemological objections above come 
into play. As one example, consider:
SensitivityEDA
17. If (a)–(c) hold, then we would still have our moral beliefs in the 
nearest possible worlds in which they are false.
18. If we would believe that P in the nearest possible worlds in which 
P is false, then we do not know that P.
19. Therefore, if (a)–(c) hold, then we have no substantive moral knowl-
edge.
(18) simply represents the general constraint on knowledge mentioned 
originally in premise (7) of Sensitivity. The other constraints could (and 
have) played similar roles in defense of (13).
But what about (17)? What is it about realism that generates the worry 
that our moral beliefs are insensitive (when assuming evolutionary pres-
sure and no independent confirmation)? Roughly, the worry is that my 
belief that I ought to take care of my children is adaptive regardless of 
whether it is true: believing it makes us more likely to pass on our genetic 
material even if it is false. (Compare to the perceptual case: it is usually 
only adaptive to believe that there is a tiger nearby if there actually is.) 
Thus, in the nearest worlds in which this claim is false, we still believe it.
Anti-realists don’t face the same fate. Take the (toy) anti-realist view 
that an act is wrong iff—and wholly because—I believe that it is wrong. 
On this view, supposing that it is true that I ought to take care of my chil-
dren, this is only true because I believe that it is true. Where it is false, I do 
not believe that it is true—as a direct result of the theory. So, in the nearest 
worlds in which it is false, I do not believe it.
8This argument is meant to capture what is common to the EDAs cited in n. 7 above in the 
most charitable way possible. 
9Critics of (14) include Shafer­Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 5–8; Fitzpatrick, “No 
Darwinian Dilemma,” 241–246; Parfit, On What Matters, 534–538; Huemer, “Revisionary 
Intuitionism”; James, An Introduction to Evolutionary Ethics, 79–81; Copp, “Darwinian Skep-
ticism,” 194; Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 155. Such replies, while theism­compatible, are 
not uniquely theistic.
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There is a version of the Standard EDA that relies on each of the con-
straints on knowledge above, but I need not spell them out here. My point 
here is simply to show how the Standard EDA can be a vehicle for a variety 
of different epistemological objections and to set the stage for an explana-
tion of how theists might reply to the Standard EDA. In extremely general 
terms, on the Standard EDA realists supposedly run afoul of each constraint 
because they think that the moral facts “float free” of our moral beliefs, 
whereas anti-realists think that there is a close dependence of the facts on 
our beliefs, allowing them to say that such beliefs are non-coincidentally 
true, formed on the basis of a non-accidentally reliable method, etc.
2. The Natural Theistic Reply to the Standard EDA
Many philosophers seem to think that, while the Standard EDA is at the 
very least prima facie problematic for the realist, it is clearly not problem-
atic for the theistic moral realist.10 In most cases, this seems to be so clear to 
such philosophers that they relegate the point to a short paragraph, if not 
a footnote. Thus, Kahane:
If we were the designed products of God, then it does seem rational for us to 
rely on our natural doxastic dispositions given that these were implanted in 
us by an omniscient and omnibenevolent being.11
Bedke similarly claims:
Given this [our moral beliefs’ causal history], it would be a great cosmic 
coincidence if the causal order were orchestrated just perfectly, so as to pro-
duce intuitions and beliefs that accurately reflect the ethical facts. We would 
need something like a god rigging the ethical facts and the causal order so 
as to ensure their serendipitous coincidence.12
The idea, I think, being that if we had evidence of such a god, the evolu-
tionary objection from “cosmic coincidence”—in Bedke’s terms—would 
disappear.
There are also those who claim that theism can easily solve a general 
epistemological objection. Parfit considers an argument from massive 
coincidence that is independent of evolutionary considerations and claims 
that:
God might have designed our brains so that, without such causal contact 
[with mathematical facts], we can reason in ways that lead us to reach true 
answers to mathematical questions. We might have similar God-given abil-
ities to respond to reasons, and to form true beliefs about these reasons.13
10Besides those below, see Wielenberg, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 460; Bogardus, “Only 
All Naturalists,” 7, 12–13; Crow, “Plantingian Pickle,” 10–11; and Fitzpatrick, “No Darwinian 
Dilemma,” 250.
11Kahane, “Evolutionary Debunking Arguments,” 109. See also n16, which acknowledges 
further complexities. 
12Bedke, “Intuitive Non­Naturalism,” 190.
13Parfit, On What Matters, 493.
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And likewise, in discussing the argument from non-accidental reliability 
mentioned above, Setiya claims that:
Things look different if we turn to God. Assuming God can know the truth 
in ethics, even if it is irreducible, he may create in us, or some of us, reliable 
dispositions. On this account, ethical principles can explain how we are dis-
posed to form true beliefs [thus meeting the non-accidental reliability con-
straint]. This is, I think, the only hope for ethical knowledge if the facts are 
constitutively independent of us.14
So according to Setiya, not only can theism solve a major epistemological 
problem for realism, but it alone can.
However, things are not so easy for the theist as such philosophers have 
made them look. In fact, what’s lacking from all of these philosophers’ 
work is any real description of how the theistic response to the Standard 
EDA is supposed to work. In the rest of this section, I hope to give a plau-
sible model for how a theistic reply to the Standard EDA would proceed. 
Only then can I point out the obstacles to such a reply.
First, we should get clear on the goal of theistic replies to the Standard 
EDA. Some of the quoted theistic replies above may be read as arguing 
that it is possible that realism is true, and we have moral knowledge. It is 
tempting to read them, that is, as arguing:
a. The evolutionary debunking argument fails in general, because it is 
possible that theism is true, and on theism, it’s possible that moral 
realism is true and we have substantive moral knowledge.
(a) takes the task of debunking arguments to be to show the impossibility of 
moral knowledge. But this doesn’t make sense of why such authors go on 
to present their own non-theistic proposals—why would they, if they had 
already defeated the Standard EDA?
My construal of debunking arguments makes sense of such reasoning: 
the Standard EDA is an argument that we don’t have moral knowledge on 
realism, not that we can’t. (Nor does it proceed to the former by way of the 
latter: surely the Empirical Premise is, if true, only contingently true.) So, 
the theist needs to do more than show the compossibility of (i) her brand 
of theism,15 (ii) moral realism, and (iii) our substantive moral knowledge. 
Yet she need not show that (iii) deductively follows from (i) and (ii), since she 
is only trying to rebut an argument that (ii) and (iii) don’t co-obtain. So, the 
theist’s task is to show, instead:
b. The Standard EDA fails for theists because, on the assumption of 
one’s brand of theism, it’s plausible—not merely possible—that if 
moral realism is true, then we have substantive moral knowledge.
14Setiya, Knowing Right from Wrong, 114.
15By one’s “brand” of theism I mean simply theism, plus whatever claims one endorses 
about God that are not essential to theism per se. 
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This means that, with a very important exception to be noted shortly, the 
theist is free to rely on any claim that is plausible on the assumption of her 
brand of theism to show that assuming (i) and (ii) makes (iii) plausible.
So, here’s one example of how the theist could reply to the Standard 
EDA. Call it “the Natural Reply.” God, if he exists, is omnipotent, omni-
scient, and morally perfect. Because he is omnipotent and omniscient, he 
has the ability to either (a) start the causal order in such a way that evolu-
tion results in human beings who have moral knowledge or (b) monitor 
the evolutionary process and intervene in the causal order to “tweak” that 
process if he foresees that it will lead to humans who don’t have moral 
knowledge.16 The latter would be a form of “special divine action,” which 
is assumed by some to be more problematic than other forms of God’s 
action such as creating and sustaining the world.17 I will employ no such 
assumption here,18 but at any rate, if special divine action is especially 
problematic, (a) is still open for the theist.
To see how this would work in more detail, assume that the standard 
debunker supports (13)—the Epistemological Premise—via SensitivityEDA. 
In either (a) or (b), we would end up with sensitive moral beliefs: in the 
nearest possible worlds in which our actual moral beliefs are false, God 
brings it about that we don’t have them. (Of course, he could do (b) while 
also doing something akin to (a)—i.e., starting the causal order in such a 
way that, with the fewest possible “tweaks” on his part, it will result in 
humans with true moral beliefs.) And—very importantly—because God 
is morally perfect, he will do either (a) or (b). This is because a morally 
perfect being wants his creatures to be good, and goodness (at least for 
humans) requires moral knowledge.19
3. A Challenge for the Natural Reply
In this section, I will present a challenge for the Natural Reply. My argu-
ment relies on a controversial constraint on replies to the Standard EDA. 
I give an argument for that constraint, but in the end, I assume its truth 
for the sake of argument: if it is false, replies are incredibly cheap, and 
all realists—theists and non-theists—are in the clear. To be clear: I don’t 
want to argue that the Natural Reply decisively fails. I mean just to use it 
as a specific model to show what I’ll then argue is a much more general 
challenge for theistic replies.
The Natural Reply relies on the following claims: (i) a morally perfect 
being would want his creatures to be morally good, and (ii) moral goodness 
(at least for humans) requires moral knowledge (and hence, e.g., sensitive 
16See Sober, “Evolution Without Naturalism” and Sober, “Evolutionary Theory, Causal 
Completeness, and Theism” for an argument that it is compatible with evolutionary theory 
that God guided certain mutations. 
17See Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, ch. 3.
18See Plantinga, Where the Conflict Really Lies, chs. 3–4, for an argument that it is false.
19The Natural Reply might be thought problematic independently of its use as a reply to 
the Standard EDA. But such objections are not my concern here. 
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moral beliefs). Each of these is plausibly a substantive moral claim; surely 
at least one is. But recall that the Standard EDA attempts to give decisive 
reason to think that it is precisely substantive moral claims that we can’t 
know to be true. Surely we are unjustified in relying on a premise P in 
an explanation if we have decisive reason to think that we don’t know 
that P. (Imagine telling your friend that he shouldn’t eat meat because it 
results in harm to animals but that you don’t know that it results in harm 
to animals!) So, by relying on (i) and (ii) in her reply to the Standard EDA, 
the theist assumes that she does not have decisive reason to think that she 
doesn’t know that those claims are true. But this is just to assume that the 
Standard EDA fails in the course of an argument that attempts to show 
that the Standard EDA fails.
The problem is going to be hard to get away from for the theist. He 
could easily fill in the details of his story differently: perhaps God wants 
us to have moral knowledge because a morally perfect being would want 
to maximize utility, and the best way for humans to maximize utility is 
by their having moral knowledge. (Again, there may be independent 
problems here.) But it’s easy to see that this variation also relies on a sub-
stantive moral claim and will for that reason also beg the question against 
epistemological objections. Because the problem is so general, we can 
formulate it as a condition on any theistic reply to the epistemological 
objections in question:
(No Moral Claims) A reply to an epistemological objection to moral re-
alism cannot rely on a substantive moral premise.20
(I will soon argue that No Moral Claims ought to be narrower, but this is the 
constraint as it is suggested in the literature.)
Let’s say that a reply to an epistemological objection relies on a premise 
just when the content of that premise is part of the explanation of why we 
have moral knowledge. Importantly, a reply doesn’t rely on a premise (in 
this restricted sense) when it merely enables the explanation of our moral 
knowledge.21 That I desired a Dr. Pepper might be part of the explanation 
of why I walked to the 7-Eleven. Yet, though I wouldn’t have walked to 
the 7-Eleven had I desired much more strongly to stay home, that I didn’t 
desire more strongly to stay home is not part of the explanation of my 
walking to 7-Eleven. It merely enables the explanation. In my sense then, 
the explanation of my walking to the 7-Eleven relies on the claim that I de-
sired a Dr. Pepper, but not on the claim that I didn’t desire more strongly 
to stay at home.
A brief word on the necessity of the distinction: lots of things are rele-
vant, in some broad sense, to an explanation. It is in this broad sense that 
20As I will construe it, No Moral Claims bans relying on substantive moral claims regard-
less of whether they are considered “part of” one’s theistic position (as opposed to being an 
independent premise). Mutatis mutandis for all later modifications of No Moral Claims.
21See Dancy, Ethics Without Principles, ch. 3.
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both my desire for Dr. Pepper and my lack of overriding desire are relevant 
to my walking to the 7-Eleven. And it is in the same sense that it’s relevant 
that I’m not asleep, and that I’m generally physically able to pursue the 
objects of my desires. But we don’t want all of these things entering into the 
explanans—otherwise the explanans will be infinitely large! After all, there 
are infinitely many desires that I don’t have but that (if I did have them) 
would override my present desire for a Dr. Pepper. So, we need some way 
of distinguishing those things that are relevant to the explanation, but 
which aren’t themselves part of the explanans. And what seems to unite 
such things is that, either by their presence or absence, they allow the ex-
planation to occur.
No Moral Claims only says that replies to epistemological objections to re-
alism cannot rely on substantive moral claims and leaves open whether they 
can have substantive moral enabling conditions. The reason for the latter 
is that, if replies couldn’t have substantive moral enabling conditions, it 
would be impossible to give a successful reply of any kind to the epistemo-
logical objection in question. For here is a condition without meeting which 
any such reply would fail: that there is a (morally) evil demon deceiving us 
about everything (or at least, everything it’s possible for us to be deceived 
about). Were there such a demon, no exculpatory reply on behalf of our 
moral knowledge could succeed; yet the absence of such a demon seems 
not to be part of the explanans of how we have any given kind of knowledge, 
but rather to merely enable the explanation. Thus, any such reply, theistic or 
not, fails without the enabling condition that there is no such demon.
I think that, in light of that, No Moral Claims would be overbroad were 
it to outlaw substantive moral enabling conditions. But let me settle for 
establishing just this: were No Moral Claims to outlaw substantive moral 
enabling conditions, my project, as well as anyone else’s who wants to 
reply to any epistemological objection to realism, would be doomed from 
the start (whether it relies on theism or not). So, I’ll assume that No Moral 
Claims allows for substantive moral enabling conditions—i.e., it reads as I 
formulate it above—for the sake of argument.
There is a hardy debate about whether No Moral Claims is true. Many 
argue that it is.22 Many others argue that it is not, since in order to reply 
to skepticism in other domains—e.g., the perceptual—we must rely on 
substantive claims within that domain.23 I cannot settle the dispute here. 
22See Shafer­Landau, “Evolutionary Debunking,” 32–35; Horn, “Evolution and the Epis-
temological Challenge”; Behrends, “Meta­normative Realism,” 7–8; Vavova, “Debunking 
Evolutionary Debunking,” 81; Morton, “A New Evolutionary Debunking Argument”; and 
Morton, “When Do Replies.”
23See Schafer, “Evolution and Normative Scepticism,” 475–476; Shafer­Landau, “Evo-
lutionary Debunking,” 21–23; Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 175; Setiya, Knowing Right 
from Wrong, 79; White, “You Just Believe that Because . . . ,” sec. 4.2; Vavova, “Debunking 
Evolutionary Debunking,” sec. 3.1; Berker, “Does Evolutionary Psychology,” sec. 8; and 
Dogramaci, “Explaining Our Moral Reliability.” See also Clarke-Doane, “Morality and Math-
ematics” and Bedke, “Intuitive Non­Naturalism,” sec. 3.2, although these are more general 
over­generalization worries.
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I think No Moral Claims is plausible enough. But more importantly, as 
above, the question I’m concerned with here—whether theism is immune 
to epistemological objections to realism—is really only interesting on the 
assumption of No Moral Claims. If we can rely on substantive moral claims 
in replying to the Standard EDA, then replies are fairly cheap.24 David 
Enoch—and other proponents of “third-factor replies”—have shown how, 
on the assumption of just one substantive moral premise, it is no longer 
surprising that we ended up with true moral beliefs.
Enoch assumes that anything that promotes survival is at least some-
what good. If that’s right, then when X promotes survival, X is good. But 
when X promotes survival, because of the evolutionary story, we should 
also not be surprised that we ended up believing that X is good (it will 
make us more likely to pursue X). This gives us an explanation of the 
striking correlation of our moral beliefs with the moral facts.25 This sort 
of reply could at the very least succeed against versions of the Standard 
EDA that identify the fundamental epistemological problem as one of 
accidental reliability or coincidental truth since, if we have an explana-
tion of the correlation of our beliefs and their truth, their truth is not a 
coincidence, nor is our reliability accidental. And it may be harnessed as a 
reply to safety- and sensitivity-based worries (though I cannot pursue this 
question here). So, I will assume No Moral Claims because our question 
here is only of interest if it is true.
The Natural Reply, though it does seem to rely on substantive moral 
claims, is not necessarily doomed. As I’ll argue in section 5, relying on 
substantive moral claims is not automatically a problem: just when they 
are constitutively independent of any agent’s attitudes. I’ll leave open (for 
now) whether the Natural Reply has the resources to maintain that each 
of the substantive moral claims it relies on are not mind-independent in 
this way. So, let the content of this section stand as a defeasible worry for 
the Natural Reply.
4. A Challenge for Any Theistic Reply
But No Moral Claims isn’t just a problem for the Natural reply. In this section, 
I’ll issue a challenge to any theistic reply to the Standard EDA: the theist 
needs to avoid appealing to a substantive moral claim in the course of what 
I’ll argue is her best line of response to the Standard EDA. I think that the 
theist can answer the challenge. It’s just that answering the challenge turns 
the theistic reply into something far different than the Natural Reply.
The theist’s job, in giving a distinctly theistic reply to the Standard EDA, 
is to show that, on the assumption of her brand of theism, the following 
claim is true:
24Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, ch. 7; Schafer, “Evolution and Normative Scepticism,” 
477; Wielenberg, “Evolutionary Debunking”; Brosnan, “Do the Evolutionary Origins”; Skar-
saune, “Darwin and Moral Realism”; Parfit, On What Matters, 532–533; Setiya, Knowing Right 
from Wrong, ch. 2; and Dworkin, “Objectivity and Truth,” 125.
25See Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously, 7.4.
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(Divine Action) God has intentionally acted so as to bring about (or 
make likely) our moral knowledge.
Of course, there are logically possible alternatives here, which still make 
appeal to God. Perhaps, for example, God unintentionally brought about 
our moral knowledge. But these alternatives seem so implausible that the 
theist, in appealing to them, would no longer have a minimally plausible 
response to the Standard EDA. So, since theism doesn’t on its own entail 
Divine Action, the theist must convince us that we get Divine Action on the 
assumption that her brand of theism is true.
Here’s what I consider a very natural way of doing this. When an om-
niscient, perfectly rational being—which the God of theism is—has most 
overall normative reason (henceforth “reason”) to do something, he will do 
that thing. (Aquinas endorses a similar, though weaker thesis—but about 
the good rather than normative reasons—when he claims that the “vol-
untary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended.”26) One argument 
for this runs as follows. Assuming a minimal type of motivational inter-
nalism, according to which a perfect being’s motives are in proportion to 
his beliefs about his reasons, and that a perfect being would be omniscient, 
it follows that a perfect being’s motives are in proportion to his reasons. 
If perfect beings cannot experience weakness of will, then a perfect being 
will always do what he has most overall reason to do.27
So, the theist should argue that God at some point had most overall 
reason to bring about our moral knowledge. This would ideally involve 
two separate arguments: an argument that God had reason to bring 
about our moral knowledge, and an argument that this reason was not 
outweighed by any other reasons God had at the time. (That God has 
reasons—even moral reasons—to act doesn’t, of course, commit us to the 
controversial claim that God has moral obligations since God could have 
a (moral) reason to Φ without having an obligation to Φ.28)
Unfortunately, the second task is a huge one. But I take it as prima 
facie plausible that the God of theism wouldn’t have strong reason to do 
anything incompatible with our moral knowledge—at least, such reason 
wouldn’t be strong enough to outweigh his reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge. (If I am wrong about this, then we were all silly to as-
sume that the theist could ever have a response to the Standard EDA: God 
would not have ever brought about our moral knowledge!) Importantly, 
accounts that require this stipulation won’t, just in virtue of this, violate 
No Moral Claims. That there are no counter-balancing reasons for God not 
to bring about our moral knowledge merely enables, but does not explain, 
26See Aquinas, Summa Theologica IaIIae, Q. 8. See also Leftow, “Aquinas on God and Moral 
Truth.” 
27See Murphy, God’s Own Ethics, 27–28; Murphy, “Is an Absolutely Perfect Being Morally 
Perfect?”; and Swinburne, Coherence of Theism, 184–209.
28See Alston, “Some Suggestions for Divine Command Theorists” for an argument that 
God has no moral obligations.
303THEISTS AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM
why God would bring about our moral knowledge. Rather, God’s reasons 
explain why he would so act. Thus, a response that requires that God not 
have counter-balancing reason not to bring about our moral knowledge 
doesn’t rely on this claim, in the technical sense I use here, and so such a 
response won’t violate No Moral Claims. So, I will assume here that if the 
theist has shown that God at some point had reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge, he has thereby shown that Divine Action is true.
It’s important to see that this is just as much a challenge for theistic re-
plies to any of the epistemological objections that I have mentioned. Recall 
that they all share the same conclusion: if moral realism is true, then no 
agent has any substantive moral knowledge. So, if theistic responses to the 
Standard EDA require the theist to show Divine Action, then likewise for 
the other objections. In each case, the theist needs to show the same thing: 
that God intentionally brought about our moral knowledge. In order to 
reply to any of the objections I’ve mentioned, the theist must argue for 
Divine Action without appealing to substantive moral claims.
5. Hope for the Theistic Moral Realist
Thus far, I have played the pessimist. I have issued a challenge that, if 
unanswered, entails that theists are not in any privileged position with 
regard to answering epistemological objections to moral realism. But in 
this section of the paper, I want to explore whether the theist can answer 
this challenge. I will outline and evaluate two ways in which the theist 
could reply to the Standard EDA—and thus the other epistemological 
objections mentioned here—without violating No Moral Claims (or rather, 
the condition as it ought to be formulated, which I am about to lay out). I 
conclude that the theist actually can successfully reply to epistemological 
objections to moral realism, in a way that non-theists cannot.
First let me canvas a type of reply I won’t be giving but to which I see 
no in-principle barrier. This kind of reply appeals to divine revelation that 
has as its content moral truth. As Tomas Bogardus argues, this could be in 
a number of ways.29 Among them: divinely-inspired Scripture, the inner 
testimony of the Holy Spirit, etc. Such replies need not rely on any kind of 
moral claim—God speaks, and we listen.
I won’t argue against such replies here. But I intend to give a different 
kind of reply, one more in line with both the spirit of the Natural Reply, 
as well as the comments I canvassed earlier, from Kahane, Bedke, Parfit, 
and Setiya.30 The idea behind those authors’ comments, which I tried to 
exemplify in the Natural Reply, was to avoid appealing to divine revela-
tion to supply the content of moral truth. Rather, these views attempt to 
give theistic accounts of moral knowledge which do not depend on the 
knower recognizing the authority of divine testimony. Yet I argue we can 
29Bogardus, “Only All Naturalists.”
30I do, however, allow for theists to appeal to revelation of claims that do not run afoul of 
No Moral Claims (as it will presently be modified). 
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still avoid violating No Moral Claims (at least in reformulated form, which 
I’ll give shortly).
The appeal of this sort of reply is at least threefold. First, it’s interesting 
in its own right to have a distinct kind of reply from revelation-based re-
plies. Second, my reply will be compatible with a broad range of theistic 
positions that the revelation-based replies will not. Revelation-based re-
plies don’t come incredibly cheaply: God must have revealed just the right 
moral truths, with a fairly high clarity and lack of ambiguity, in order for 
this gambit to work. Views on which God has revealed only some rela-
tively peripheral moral truths, or on which we can’t be too sure how to 
interpret the moral claims God has made—the list could go on—will not 
be able to save moral knowledge. Many theists will therefore not be in a 
position to make use of revelation-based replies; a non-revelation-based 
theistic reply will be of interest to them. Finally, and perhaps most sa-
liently, revelation­based replies seem to require the knower to recognize 
the authority of divine testimony—why else trust the Scriptures, or the 
testimony of the Spirit? Such accounts will have a hard time allowing for 
the moral knowledge of (at least) those who reject the existence of God. 
On the other hand, if replies like mine work, theism saves the possibility 
of moral knowledge in general—even for non-theists.
It’s very important to see that No Moral Claims is too broad a restriction, 
as stated. Recall the dialectic: debunkers argue that what causes problems 
for our moral knowledge is the claim that some moral truths are constitu-
tively independent of anyone’s attitudes. What motivates No Moral Claims 
is the idea that, when a realist relies on a moral claim in her response to 
the Standard EDA, she’s relying on exactly the kind of claim knowledge of 
which the debunker is targeting. So, it seems that No Moral Claims ought 
to be restricted:
(No Moral Claims*) A reply to an epistemological objection to moral re-
alism cannot rely on a substantive moral premise that, if true, is true 
independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Since it is only attitude­independent moral claims that the Standard EDA 
targets, surely it should only be such claims that are off­limits in replying 
to the Standard EDA.
So, the moral realist needs to establish that God has a reason to bring 
about our moral knowledge without relying on any claim that is both a 
substantive moral claim and attitude­independent if true. In the remainder 
of this section, I first want to show two ways that the theist could do this. 
In the next section, I’ll show why the same general strategy works even 
for normative realists replying to epistemological worries for normative 
realism.
The key insight in the theistic realist’s response is that moral realists 
need not think that all moral truths are attitude­independent. This follows 
from realism as I defined it above—it claims only that some moral truths 
are mind-independent, not that all are. Of course, the question is whether 
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this is the right way of characterizing the debate. For in reality there are 
three salient positions: that no moral truths are mind-independent, that 
some are, and that all are. I believe the middle claim is the important claim 
for the realist. Not only is this often how the debate is characterized31—
especially within the debunking literature32—but the interesting question 
seems to be whether there exist any truths of a certain kind (mind-inde-
pendent moral truths), not so much whether all moral truths are like this.33 
At any rate, this is the kind of realism I am concerned with here. So, we 
need not worry about whether any given normative claim that the theist 
relies on is a substantive moral claim so long as that claim is one such that, 
if true, its truth is fully explained by some agent’s (or agents’) attitudes.
God, of course, has attitudes, and there doesn’t seem to be any barrier 
to those attitudes explaining his reasons, just as our attitudes often explain 
our reasons. The task for the theistic moral realist is to find an attitude that 
God plausibly has that could fully explain his reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge. The theist must, however, do this in a way that doesn’t 
invite further questions about why God has that attitude. Otherwise, it 
might be that while God’s reason is grounded in an attitude, he only holds 
that attitude because some mind­independent, substantive moral claim is 
true, such that the attitude is explained by the mind­independent moral 
truth. Then the theist’s story would still violate No Moral Claims*. So, what 
we want is a reason that is fully explained by attitudes, where these at-
titudes are not explained by any further mind-independent, substantive 
moral truths.34
Suppose, then, that God wants us to have moral knowledge because it 
will be good for us. He wants what is good for us simply because he loves 
us—and that seems like as good a place as any to end an explanation. 
Thus, God’s reason to bring about our moral knowledge is satisfactorily 
explained—in a way that does not demand further explanation—by his 
love for us. This reason is thus explained by someone’s attitudes—i.e., 
God’s—and so the theist does not violate No Moral Claims* in relying on 
the claim that it obtains.
But why think that moral knowledge will be good for us? Because it 
makes us resemble God more, no matter what the moral truths are, and 
it is good for us to resemble God. First, since God knows the moral truths 
(because he knows everything), our knowing them makes us more like 
him. Second, moral knowledge will help us to do what we have moral 
reason to do, regardless of what that is, since we are much more likely to 
do what we have moral reason to do if we know what that is. To the extent 
31E.g., Enoch, Taking Morality Seriously.
32E.g., Street, “Darwinian Dilemma,” 110. 
33In addition, this keeps the realism/antirealism debate analogous to the externalism/
internalism debate about reasons. See Finlay and Schroeder, “Reasons for Action.” 
34A referee worries that, for any reason which I propose is fully explained by an attitude, 
it will in fact only be partially explained by that attitude and will require mind­independent, 
substantive moral truths to complete that explanation. I think this line of thinking is only 
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that we do what we have moral reason to do, we more closely resemble 
God since God does what he has moral reason to do.
As Robert Adams has pointed out, the notion of resemblance presents 
some peculiar problems.35 It’s not clear what resemblance is for one thing, 
since merely sharing a property is not enough: a squirrel could have 
the same number of hairs as me and not resemble me any more than an 
otherwise identical squirrel. Furthermore, merely resembling God is not 
sufficient for goodness: parodies resemble their objects but do not share in 
their virtues. (Though Adams is concerned with goodness rather than the 
good­for relation, we might have a related worry about the latter: I may 
parody God, and thus resemble him, and be worse­off for it.)
I can only dip into such deep waters here, but it is worth noting that 
while our theistic realist will eventually want to flesh out her theory of re-
semblance, the issue doesn’t present the problems it does for Adams and so 
is not nearly so pressing. Adams is so worried about the above worries in 
large part because he needs to make sure to give a realistic account of resem-
blance—one on which the fact that two things resemble each other obtains 
mind-independently. He has to worry about this because on his view, all 
goodness is grounded in resembling God, such that an anti-realistic un-
derstanding of resemblance would result in thorough-going anti-realism 
about the good, which he wants to avoid.36 But our theistic moral realist is 
not committed to the claim that goodness is always grounded in resembling 
God—just that this is sometimes the case. And, so, even if resemblance—or 
the conditions under which resemblance to God is good for someone—is 
mind-dependent, this would only commit us to the claim that well-being 
is sometimes mind-dependent. And that is consistent with realism as I’ve 
defined it—even realism about well­being in particular.
Now, it might be objected that my explanation above appeals to sub-
stantive moral claims. After all, I said that (i) God knows the moral truth, 
that (ii) God does what he has moral reason to do, that (iii) knowing the 
moral truth will help us do what we have moral reason to do, and that 
(because of all this) (iv) we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowl-
edge. Are none of (i–iv) substantive, mind­independent moral claims? 
After all, they each use the word “moral,” variously making claims about 
moral knowledge, moral truth, and moral reasons.
We saw above that (iv) might be mind-dependent and the theistic 
realist can consistently endorse this. But that won’t help with (i)–(iii). So, 
I will argue that the theist avoids violating No Moral Claims* here because 
none of (i)–(iv) is a substantive moral claim. As I noted above, defining 
“substantive moral claim” is very hard, and I argued that we only need a 
non­definitional characterization of such claims: they’re the set of claims 
plausible if we assume that all moral truths are mind-independent—and I have argued that 
realists are not committed to this.
35Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 31–33.
36Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, 18. 
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knowledge of which debunkers are targeting. While I don’t intend to give 
a definition of “substantive moral claim,” I think the following is a good 
test, at least for claims that do not represent principles: a claim is a sub-
stantive moral claim only if its truth value changes depending on what 
we have moral reason to do.37 But (i)–(iv) will be true regardless of what 
anyone has moral reason to do.
Consider (i): God, because he knows everything, knows the moral truth 
regardless of what moral reasons obtain or fail to obtain. If rational beings 
have moral reason to maximize utility, then he knows this. If rational be-
ings have no such reason, he knows this. Now consider (ii): whether God 
has moral reason to deceive or refrain from deception, to kill or refrain 
from killing, he will still do what he has moral reason to do. Similarly, for 
(iii): whether we have moral reason to lie or not (etc.), knowing the moral 
truth will help us do what we have moral reason to do. And finally, con-
sider (iv): because of the foregoing, we resemble God insofar as we have 
moral knowledge, regardless of what anyone has moral reason to do.38
Before I move on to consider a second strategy for the theistic realist, 
let’s consider a second objection: this first strategy relies on claims about 
well-being, or the good-for relation. Is well-being a moral phenomenon? If 
so, then insofar as such truths are attitude­independent, the theist cannot 
rely on substantive claims about well-being, such as that it is good for us 
to resemble God.
The theist might try replying that the good-for relation is non-moral. I 
think this is right, but for reasons that will soon become clear, this won’t help 
the cause. The theist ought instead to argue that the claims about well-being 
required to make his case are not true independent of anyone’s attitudes. 
Having desires satisfied, experiencing pleasure, being happy: all of these 
states can fully explain an increase in well­being, without conflicting with 
moral realism, as explained above. Not only that, such explanations are 
compatible even with objectivist theories of well-being since objectivist 
theories allow that sometimes having a desire satisfied (etc.) is a benefit.
And it’s easy to make the case that moral knowledge will promote such 
states without relying on any substantive moral claims: we will be happy/
have more desires filled/experience more pleasure insofar as we resemble 
God, regardless of what anyone has moral reason to do. These claims are 
37As I note in the main text, moral principles are an exception: they are often substantive, 
while being compatible with the obtaining of any moral reasons. “If punching John shortens 
his life, then we have moral reason to refrain from punching him” is technically compatible 
with both having moral reason to refrain from punching John and not having such reason 
(after all, the conditional is compatible with the falsity of the antecedent). But we can brush 
aside such examples here since we’re not aiming for a sure­fire test for some claim’s being a 
substantive moral one. The test seems like a good one for claims like (i)–(iv). 
38One might think there is cause for worry here if Robert Adams is right that for any 
non-supreme good, X is good because X resembles God, the supreme Good (see Adams, 
Finite and Infinite Goods, ch. 1). But even if this is true, claims about resemblance to God 
need not be substantive moral claims. That goodness is fully grounded in property P does 
not entail that claims about P are moral claims. The hedonistic utilitarian need not say that 
claims about pain and pleasure are moral claims, after all.
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generally plausible on the assumption of most theistic views: does God 
want us to resemble him even though it won’t make us happier, or fulfill 
any of our desires? No—promotion of such states seems like one of the 
main reasons he would desire that we resemble him.
A second general route for the theistic moral realist also appeals to the 
claim that we resemble God insofar as we have moral knowledge and helps 
itself to claims (i)–(iv) above in order to establish that. But instead of arguing 
that it is good for us that we resemble God, the theist could here argue that 
God desires his own glorification, and he doesn’t desire this for any further 
reason—he just desires it.39 Furthermore, the theist could argue, it glorifies 
God to have his creation resemble him. Therefore, God’s desire for his own 
glorification grounds a reason to bring about our moral knowledge.
It seems perfectly in line with many theistic pictures to say that God de-
sires his own glorification. Furthermore, this is consistent with God being 
perfectly well­off since it seems possible for a perfectly well­off being to 
have desires. (At any rate, the theist is in much deeper trouble if God has 
no desires: it is a common assumption among theists that there are things 
God wants us to do.) And of course, if God’s reason to bring about our 
moral knowledge is explained by his desire for glorification, the theist 
won’t here run afoul of No Moral Claims*.
Some pieces of the above argument appeal to claims tenable on any ver-
sion of theism. The argument that we resemble God insofar as we possess 
moral knowledge appeals only to such claims—(i)–(iv) should be tenable 
on any brand of theism (or, at least, any brand compatible with moral re-
alism). Yet both replies appeal also to claims that are not part and parcel of 
theism per se. The first reply claims that God loves us and that resembling 
God is good for us. The second claims that God desires his own glorifica-
tion, and that it glorifies God when his creation resembles him. Of these 
four claims, none seems entailed by theism per se. But it seems to me that 
many brands of theism will accept either the first two or the second two. 
And those are the brands of theism that, for all I’ve argued, are in a good 
position to give replies to epistemological objections to moral realism.
6. Epistemological Objections to Normative Realism
What I have called the Standard EDA targets moral realism. Yet many 
epistemological objections, such as Street’s, have it that if normative re-
alism is true, then we have no normative knowledge.40 (Normative realism 
is the thesis that (i) sincere normative judgments express beliefs, (ii) some 
of those beliefs are true, and (iii) the truth of some normative beliefs does 
not constitutively depend on the attitude of any actual or hypothetical 
agent.) This begets the worry that an analogue of No Moral Claims holds:
39This is a weakness of the second strategy that the first does not have: God may only 
desire his own glorification because it is good (or because he has reason to, etc.) such that his 
glory­based reason is not ultimately explained merely in terms of his attitudes. In that case, the 
theist may have to appeal to a mind-independent moral claim, thus violating No Moral Claims*. 
40Street, “Darwinian Dilemma.”
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(No Normative Claims) A reply to an epistemological objection to norma-
tive realism cannot rely on a substantive normative premise.
And this is worrisome for the theist in particular because both of the 
theistic responses I proposed to the Standard EDA rely on substantive 
normative premises.
However, just as with the Standard EDA, I think that No Normative 
Claims is over-broad. Normative realism allows that some reasons are 
explained by our attitudes: in Mark Schroeder’s example, Ronnie likes 
dancing and Bradley doesn’t, and that is enough to explain why Ronnie 
has a reason to go to the party but Bradley doesn’t.41 Again, this is allowed 
by my definition of normative realism, and there is again reason to think 
the important debate is whether there are any normative truths that are 
mind-independent. As Schroeder notes, realists of any stripe should agree 
that some reasons are explained by our attitudes in this way.42 Schroeder’s 
Humean Theory of Reasons is the further, controversial claim that all rea-
sons are so explained.
So just as in the moral case, we ought to reformulate our constraint:
(No Normative Claims*) A reply to an epistemological objection to nor-
mative realism cannot rely on a substantive normative premise that, if 
true, is true independent of anyone’s attitudes.
Because he doesn’t violate this suitably qualified constraint, the theist 
can now simply import his two responses to the Standard EDA, suitably 
modified. We resemble God insofar as we have any kind of knowledge, 
after all, or insofar as we are disposed to act in accordance with any kind 
of reason. So, whether God’s reason springs from his desire for our well-
being or his desire for glorification, he will have a reason to bring about all 
normative knowledge in us.
Conclusion
Many philosophers take it as a truism that theists need not worry at all 
over various epistemological objections to moral realism: if God exists, 
certainly he could just engineer things in such a way that we end up 
with moral knowledge. But the most natural ways of arguing for this are 
stripped from us when we recognize that we cannot rely on any mind­in-
dependent substantive moral claims. However, there is hope for the theist: 
God plausibly has mind-dependent reasons to bring about our moral 
knowledge. If so, then the theist can reply to epistemological objections 
to moral realism without begging the question. Not only that, but she can 
reply to epistemological objections to normative realism without begging 
the question. The upshot here is nothing so grand as that moral/norma-
tive realists ought to be theists. However, it might be as significant as that 
41Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 1.
42Schroeder, Slaves of the Passions, 1–2.
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theists are better off with respect to epistemological objections to moral/
normative realism than are non-theists. To the extent that such objections 
succeed, non­theistic realism fails while theistic realism lives to fight an-
other day.43
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